He's just hopeless. We will come down and do some work for anyone, we'll do anything, but we won't go naked. After that they won't let him into the paddock.
So we want to pay for his leg and stuff, and also build him a new home where he can live on his own. Wilton said she can be contacted on lindalefarm gmail. They would further assume that it is their own good luck to have been born in affluent countries, that they do not deserve their favorable starting position, and that this makes the inequality unjust.
If those who live in developing countries were in the situation they find themselves in through their own fault, and not victims of bad luck, no question of distributive justice would arise. The underlying assumption seems to be that luck-affected differential standings are morally undesirable or unjust Arneson85; Tan—; Temkin; but this assumption calls for philosophical clarification.
Given the pervasiveness of luck, such clarification appears to be required whenever people end up unequally well off. It is commonplace to distinguish between retributive justice and distributive justice. In both cases the issue of bad luck arises, and offhand it seems that the role one ascribes to luck in one area will constrain the role one can ascribe to luck elsewhere: if luck raises questions about the significance of desert in the sphere of distributive justice, it will probably have similar repercussions vis-a-vis desert and retributive justice Sandel91—92; Scheffler In the present entry, however, we shall focus on relations between luck and distributive justice.
In fact it will be useful to narrow the focus further to a particular family of theories of distributive justice—namely, those involving an end-result principle of justice Nozick— End-result principles entail that one can judge whether a certain distribution of goods is desirable without knowing how it came about. Strictly speaking, Rawls himself says that the difference principle applies to the basic structure of society Scheffler—; compare Cohen—; Cohen—so for Rawls it applies only indirectly to outcomes.
On this understanding, the difference principle is not, in any straightforward sense, an end-state principle. Here we prefer to treat the difference principle as one that applies directly to outcomes. Finally, there is e utilitarianism, given which we should maximize the sum of welfare. There are two reasons for narrowing the focus in this way. First, some end-result principles have been defended on the basis of considerations about luck. No such suggestion has been made on behalf of non-end-result principles.
On this view, it may be a matter of luck what people are entitled to, and yet Nozick explicitly claims that this does not erode the relevant entitlements Nozick Second, many have inserted into end-result principles clauses that allow for deviations from the prescribed end-result provided that these deviations do not reflect luck.
For instance, most contemporary egalitarians believe that an unequal distribution that is not a matter of bad luck for the worse off could be just. Luck plays no comparable role in historical principles. They undermine alternative theories in which distributions of social and economic benefits deviating from that prescribed by the difference principle are tolerated Nozick; Arneson This point is put somewhat less strongly in the second edition of A Theory of Justice.
This is exactly what the difference principle, in one of its versions, says. While it is undeniable that luck plays a role in A Theory of Justiceand that the considerations described above are congenial to luck-egalitarians, some commentators argue that this role is exaggerated and misconceived when Rawls is understood in luck-egalitarian fashion Scheffler8—12, 24—31; Scheffler ; Scheffler ; Freeman—; Mandle24— In Section 8, we ask whether the luck-neutralizing aim can play a positive role in justifying equality, an issue that is, of course, distinct from the question whether it has been widely thought to be capable of playing such a role.
Luck has been examined closely in the writings of successive egalitarians Arneson ; Arneson ; Cohen ; Cohen ; Dworkin ; Nagel ; Rakowski ; Roemer Bad Luck Barry Roemer ; Roemer ; Temkin Arneson forthcoming. Similarly, G. A sufficientarian theory that does so might say, e. The reason sufficientarians tend not to endorse some such view is that they believe that people are entitled to a certain minimum, however they exercise their responsibility.
Luck is also appealed to by some who believe that benefits matter more, morally speaking, the worse off those to whom the benefits accrue are. Thus Richard J. Finally, while no one has argued that utilitarianism is grounded in reflections on luck, it has certainly been argued that non-luck considerations qualify our obligation to maximize welfare.
Fred Feldman, for instance, defends a version of consequentialism that adjusts utility for justice on the basis that a Bad Luck Barry is more valuable if it is deserved and less valuable, or perhaps even disvaluable, if it is undeserved Feldman Given an appropriate account of desert, this position might be looked upon as luck-utilitarianism or luck-consequentialism. The concept of luck is a curious one Dennett92; see also Pritchard—; Pritchard and Whittington To avoid various pitfalls, it helps to distinguish thin and thick notions of luck as suggested by Hurley79—80; Hurley—; Vallentyne To say that something—whether a choice or an outcome other than choice Olsaretti ; Scheffler18—19 —is a matter of thin luck for someone is to say merely that this person does not stand in a certain moral relationship to a certain object, where such moral relationship essentially involves this individual in his or her capacity as a rational agent.
To say that something is a matter of thick luck is to say this and to commit oneself to a certain account of the non-moral properties in virtue of which this moral relationship obtains. Accordingly, a thick concept of luck is a more specific version of the corresponding thin concept of luck.
There are several varieties of thin notions of luck. One is the following kind of responsibility luck:. A number of views about what makes an agent responsible for something have been taken for an overview, see Matravers14— To say that an outcome conforms to 1 is to remain neutral on which of these accounts is correct.
It has become common to distinguish between attributive and Bad Luck Barry responsibility Scanlon—; Scanlon72— The former concerns what comprises a suitable basis for moral appraisal of an agent.
The latter concerns what people are required to do for one another. While the issue of luck arises in relation to both senses of responsibility, it is the latter which is crucial to distributive justice. Thin notions of luck need not be notions of responsibility luck. Thus the following notion of desert luck is thin:. As with responsibility, a number of views about what makes an agent deserving are possible Kagan6—7; Sher7. People who think that justice should neutralize the luck specified by 2 can disagree over these accounts.
It is worth emphasizing that thin responsibility luck and thin desert luck are independent of one another. First, X may be responsible for Y and yet not deserve Y. Thus a man who heroically throws himself on to a grenade to save his comrades, thereby losing his life, is responsible for his own death—indeed this is what makes his act praiseworthy—even if he did not deserve to die. Second, X may deserve Y without being responsible for Y. Thus a poor saint who stumbles, entirely fortuitously, upon a gold nugget might deserve in the wider scheme of things to be enriched by his discovery even though he is not responsible for making it.
While clearly different, they are occasionally conflated as pointed out in Hurley— The claim that something is a matter of thin responsibility luck can be combined with various accounts of responsibility and thus various accounts of luck. It is these latter accounts— thick accounts of responsibility luck—that tell us what makes a person responsible for something. On the thick, control-based account of responsibility luck:.
Often it makes a crucial difference which items Y ranges over see Cohen25, 93; Price Suppose, for instance, that a person deliberately, and in full control, cultivates a preference for spending leisure hours driving about in her car reasonably foreseeing that the prices of gas will stay low Arneson Unfortunately, and unpredictably, the price of gas skyrockets and her preference becomes very costly.
In this case, the fact that this person prefers to spend her leisure hours driving her car is neither bad control luck, nor bad choice luck. However, the fact that she is worse off as a result of her preference may be both, since she neither chose to act in such way to make this fact obtain, nor controlled whether it did.
It has been argued that both the control-based and choice-based thick notions of luck are too broad. Most people neither control nor choose their religion, yet it seems odd to ask for compensation for feelings of guilt engendered by religious belief on the grounds that it is a matter of bad luck that one holds those beliefs Scanlon ; Cohen33— To accommodate this intuition G.
Cohen introduces the notion of counterfactual choice. One can explain this notion with the following claim:. Given the opportunity to do so, the theist would not choose to be free of the feelings of guilt engendered by his religious convictions. Therefore, it is not a matter of luck that he has such feelings and so justice does not require him to be compensated for the feelings.
Just as there are different accounts of thick responsibility luck, there are different accounts of thick desert luck. These correspond to competing accounts of the basis of desert. One notion is that of thick, non-comparative desert luck, which can be elaborated as follows:.
It may be a matter of bad thick, non-comparative desert luck that the crops of a talented, hard-working farmer are destroyed by cold weather. The list of thick notions of luck mentioned so far is not intended to be exhaustive, and each notion may of course be developed in several directions. Clearly, thick luck is quite complex.
Some accounts of luck are neither thin accounts of luck nor aim at capturing a general moral notion such as responsibility or desert. Instead they appeal to an independent conception of luck. Lottery luck is arguably one example:. The underlying idea here is that there is a sense in which the outcome of a fair lottery is a matter of luck for the person who participates in it whether or not he is responsible for it—as some accounts of responsibility imply and others do not.
It can be maintained that justice is concerned with this notion of luck independently of how it relates to responsibility and desert. Thus an egalitarian may think that it is bad if people are unequally well off as a result of differential lottery luck even if he Bad Luck Barry not made up his mind whether people are responsible for differential lottery luck.
He might add that it would be illegitimate for the state to enforce equality in face of inequality resulting from a fair lottery to which all parties consented. Also, lotteries might be excellent means of making outcomes independent of the unjust biases of distributors compare Stone—even if outcomes might be unjust despite the fact such biases played no role in their genesis.
In principle, one could also care about choice and control luck independently of how these relate to thin luck, e. However, philosophers who think that justice is a matter of eliminating differential luck have studied choice and control mainly because they assume that the absence of choice and control nullifies responsibility or desert.
Accounts of responsibility or desert affect how much luck there is in the world. If, on the one hand, one accepts a hard deterministic account of responsibility, everything is a matter of responsibility luck. A hard deterministic account of responsibility says that responsibility and determinism are incompatible, that determinism is true, and, hence, that no one is ever responsible for anything. Most believe that, if hard determinism is true, extensionally speaking, luck-egalitarianism collapses into straight equality of outcome e.
If, on the other hand, one accepts a compatibilist, reason responsiveness account of responsibility, many outcomes will not be a matter of responsibility luck, at least for some agents, Bad Luck Barry. Still, agents who act from reason responsive mechanisms may face choice situations that differ much in terms of how favorable they are in which case inequalities reflecting such differences may not be just, even if they obtain between agents who are responsible for the choices they made.
For this reason among othersit is open for compatibilist luck-egalitarians to think that little inequality can be justified by differential exercises of choice see Barry One issue which has received quite a lot of attention in the debate about justice and luck is the regression principle governing luck:.
If this principle is coupled with control or choice accounts of luck, everything turns into luck. For if we couple 9 with, say, the thick, choice-based account of responsibility luck, it follows that for my present reckless driving not to be a matter of bad luck, it will have to be the case that I am responsible for, and hence have chosen, the causes of my present reckless driving.
In turn, for me to be responsible for these causes I will in turn have to be responsible for, and hence have chosen, the causes of these causes of my reckless driving; and so on. Obviously, at some point, moving back through the causal chain e. So it will follow that I am not responsible for my present reckless driving: it is my bad luck that I drive my car in a totally irresponsible way. Generalizing this sort of reasoning, no one would ever be responsible for anything—that everything would be a matter of responsibility luck.
The view that everything is a matter of responsibility and desert luck obviously flies in the face of our everyday ascriptions of responsibility. Accordingly, this implication of the regression principle is often deployed in a corresponding reductio ad absurdum Hurley; Hurley ; Nozick; Sher67—69; Zaitchik— However, this reductio is perhaps Bad Luck Barry hasty.
If this is right, it seems we need an alternative explanation of why moral responsibility is absent in those cases where control of causes is absent.
That is, we need to explain why certain kinds of causal background to action threaten control while others do not even if we are dealing with cases with the shared feature that the agent does not control the early parts of those causal backgrounds.
That is, the reasons for which the agent acts must match the reasons for action that there in fact are sufficiently well, although this match need not be perfect. Whether either of these suggestions accommodates cases where, initially, responsibility seems to be undermined by lack of control of causes, remains to be seen.
For a brief discussion of the notion of constitutive luck see the following supplementary document: Constitutive Luck. Most observers agree that not all bad luck is unjust. Luck-egalitarians, for example, often separate option luck and brute luck and deny that instances of differential option luck are unjust. If I suddenly go blind as a result of a genetic condition, my brute luck is bad, but if I buy a lottery ticket and win, my option luck is good. The availability of insurance provides a link between brute and option luck.
This means that a person may suffer bad brute luck, and for that reason end up worse off than others, and yet the resulting inequality might reflect differential option luck see, however, Otsuka43— Roughly, this will be so if the person who ends up worse off could have insured against the sort of bad brute luck that she later suffered but declined to do so Dworkin74, So although it may be bad brute luck that I suddenly go blind as a result of a genetic condition, the fact that I end up worse off as a result of going blind if this occurs will reflect bad option luck provided suitable insurance was available to me.
This is not to say that suitable insurance against the risk of becoming blind is possible. If suitable insurance against the risk of becoming blind is not possible or possible but unreasonably expensive, it follows that ending up worse off as a result of this is, to some extent at least, a matter of bad brute luck.
First, consider a case where I can choose between two alternatives. In one sense, obviously, either risk is avoidable. After all, the chances of becoming just as badly off via a different causal route, had I chosen the other alternative, were almost as great. In the present case, I could only marginally influence the expected value of the outcome. Hence the disadvantages resulting from my choice should be seen as mostly a matter of bad brute luck. Second, suppose I am morally required to perform a certain action, say, to save someone from a burning house thereby risking some moderate burns in the process.
Let us also suppose that I am worse off than the person I save and that my doing so happens to make me even worse off than this person, since I do get burned in a way that requires expensive medical attention.
I know that there is some chance that you may defect in which case I will end up worse off. However, because I do not want to exploit you by defecting myself in case you do not, I cooperate.
As it happens you defect and I end up worse off. Again, since I am now worse off as a result of a calculated gamble, I am worse off through bad option luck. Yet, it seems plausible to hold that the inequality that results from your exploiting my resistance to exploiting you is unjust Lippert-Rasmussen ; for a different, but, related problem, see Seligman She raced to catch Central City Busbreaking a heel in the process, though was successful, much to her elation.
Becky made eye contact with Mina Chaytan and took a seat near Ramsey Deacon. Suddenly during the ride, a portal into the Speed Force opened to release The Flashwith a wave of dark matter enveloping the bus. Shortly afterwards, Becky discovered she gained meta-human powers of luck, benefiting herself at the cost of jinxing her surroundings. Believing it was the universe's way of fixing her ill-fated life, Becky eagerly began taking advantage of her powers to live an opulent lifestyle.
Three weeks later, Becky began a spree of bank robberies. When they arrived, the Uber app crashed, so Becky's ride was free. As she walked inside, the bank's employees began struggling with a series of sudden bad luck, allowing Becky to easily enter the vault. She happily stole two bags of money and left. The Flash gave chase, but slipped on a barrel of marbles Becky's powers caused to fall. That afternoon, Becky dined at a Japanese restaurant for lunch, where she ran into Kenny and his new girlfriend.
Becky ensured her powers immediately affected her ex as comeuppance. Later, Becky ate at CC Jitters as she excitedly scratched another winning lottery card. Barry explained her recent good luck came from being affected by dark matter on a city bus three weeks prior. However, Becky remained in denial and voiced her belief of her powers being a gift to compensate for her difficult life. Barry refuted this, warning that her powers were hurting bystanders. Becky expressed her pity, but simply believed it was "their turn".
Proving she had gained mastery over her powers, Becky started precipitating pre-incidents of accidents and cheerfully gloated that Barry couldn't stop her as she left Jitters.
That night, Becky returned to Starlight Getaway Casino, using her powers to earn money in roulette. Her quantum field began expanding throughout the city and into the atmosphere, causing low probability events of varying intensity: The Flash accidentally cuffing himself with power-dampening cuffsthe West house falling apart, Flight having two bird strikes and preparing to crash, and the S.
Labs particle accelerator activating at risk of exploding. As the machine began to work in Becky's favor, chaos erupted in the casino. Fortunately though when the particle accelerator exploded, it caused a hydrogen-electron collision and the charge temporarily neutralized Becky's quantum field, returning everything to normal.
As a confused Becky tried to make sense of the situation, The Flash cuffed her. After wondering if the speedster would release her, she politely surrendered.
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